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COMMENTS ON
"THE UMPIRE OF CANADIAN FEDERALISM"
By B. L. STRAYER*
In this chapter the author paints with a broad brush the picture of a
Supreme Court making "intuitive" judgments on questions of constitutional
validity of statutes, "on the basis of standards which it is making up as it goes
along". His thesis is that this has become inevitable because by the passage
of time the written constitution of 1867 is hopelessly outmoded, with little
of relevance to say to modem Canadians. Therefore the Court is obliged to
make constitutional policy as best it can, and this.process cannot realistically
be viewed as a mere exposition of existing constitutional law.
According to the author, however, the Court is not an appropriate agency
to create new constitutional norms. There is the usual criticism that the Court
is created by Parliament, its members appointed by the Governor in Council,
and yet it must adjudicate constitutional disputes between the federal and
provincial governments. Moreover, decisions on changing constitutional norms
should be made by political bodies instead because such decisions are essentially political in nature. It is suggested that in recent years the Court may
have recognized this implicitly by its apparent reluctance to find statutes invalid.
Given this analysis of the situation, Professor Weiler makes a case for
less, rather than more, judicial review in future. If I understand him correctly,
he is suggesting that we should drastically reduce or do away with exclusive
legislative powers, federal or provincial, and that most, if not all, powers
should be concurrent. For the courts the only remaining role - thought to
be a limited one - would be to determine questions of conflict between overlapping laws, in order to apply where necessary the rule of paramountcy of
federal laws. Also, provincial laws could apparently be judicially scrutinized
where it is suggested that they discriminate against "extraprovincial citizens
or products".
While it is not entirely clear how we would achieve this state of things,
the author indicates two ways in which judicial review might be reduced to
a minimum even without constitutional change. First, the Court itself, by
generally upholding statutory innovations, might reduce to insignificance the
judicial review of legislation. Secondly, the rules of standing might be narrowed to prevent a private individual from challenging any law on the grounds
that it merely invades an exclusive but unused legislative power of another
jurisdiction, unless he has the consent to do so of the Attorney-General for
* Assistant Deputy Minister, Department of Justice, Ottawa. Views expressed are,
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that jurisdiction. (This is in contrast to the "conflict" situation where Professor Weiler considers judicial review to be appropriate).
If the constitution is not going to be developed by the courts, how then
is it to adjust to changing conditions? Professor Weiler emphasizes that such
development is a political process which should be left to intergovernmental
negotiation - not particularly with a view to changing the constitution each
time, but rather to striking new bargains from time to time concerning the
exercise of (apparently) a wide range of new concurrent powers. For precedent he very aptly refers to past fiscal, economic, and social policies where
respective governmental roles have developed and changed through a variety
of intergovernmental arrangements more than through constitutional amendment.
A number of questions come to mind in reflecting on the author's analysis and conclusions.
First, it is difficult to accept - at least without more evidence - that
the Supreme Court is simply "making up as it goes along" the standards of
constitutional validity. The main example cited for this proposition, the
Manitoba Egg Reference,1 is compared to several previous decisions which,
if followed, would in the author's view have dictated a different result. I
would agree that the distinctions are not clearly articulated in the Manitoba
Egg Reference judgment, but it was the potential for discrimination against
out-of-province producers - a potential highlighted by the stated purpose
of the scheme - which seems to have been the most important factor in the
decision of the majority. This would distinguish it from the Carnation Co.2
case and other earlier decisions upholding provincial laws. Or, to take
another test used by the U. S. Supreme Court and cited by the author, the
cases could be reconciled on the basis of a "balancing" of legitimate provincial (state) benefits against the burden on interprovincial (interstate) commerce. In fairness to the author he warns us in the preface3 that he has had
to be selective in the use of examples and that he has published elsewhere
more extensive studies of the subjects covered. Nevertheless, his first premise
- that the Court is of necessity making purely policy decisions - is not in
my view sufficiently demonstrated by this one example. Thus, in proceeding
to the remainder one is left with some nagging doubts as to whether the
interface between intraprovincial and interprovincial trade regulation is not
in any federal system one of the most difficult areas for the enunciation
(judicially or politically) of universal principles, and whether the undesirability of judicial review of legislation is adequately established by reference
to this particular problem.
Secondly, I am skeptical that the whole burden of constitutional development can or should be placed on the political processes. Pressures of time
I A.-G.
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alone would not permit settlement through intergovernmental agreement of
every constitutional norm. Admittedly, judicial review cannot solve every
problem either, but its existence and the occasional resort to it provide the
necessary "ground rules" for many intergovernmental relationships. Just as
the courts through the common law have provided interstitial, incremental,
law-making where legislative bodies would never have had the time or inclination, so they can also through constitutional development supplement the
political processes. And frequently the political processes can provide no
answer if intergovernmental agreement cannot be reached. It must be kept
in mind that the negotiating process is usually not simply a bilateral exercise,
but frequently involves a ten-to-one relationship with sometimes up to eleven
different views as to the appropriate solution. To revert to the "balancing"
of provincial interests against the benefits of a common market, is it inevitable
that a satisfactory balance - or indeed any balance - will be struck through
the political process? Modern examples could be cited to suggest otherwise.
Thirdly, the acceptance of wholesale concurrency of powers would, in
any event, probably leave the courts occupying a central place again in constitutional development. It is suggested that operative conflict might be confined to situations where the laws are "legally contradictory", presumably
leaving a narrow field of judicial review. But it is not hard to imagine that
this would become the central issue in a vast array of alleged conflicts made
possible by the new concurrency of all or most powers.
Fourthly, events may already have overtaken Professor Weiler's call for
a drastic limitation on the standing of individuals to attack constitutional
validity of statutes in situations where there is no conflict between existing
f&leral and provincial laws. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in
Thorson v. A.-G. Can.4 has gone far to rationalize the law of standing here,
but by extending rather than reducing the right of individual taxpayers to
challenge the validity of statutes.
Finally, and by way of summary, it may be argued that Professor Weiler
takes too pessimistic a view of the future and utility of judicial review of
legislation by the Supreme Court. Admittedly, there is room for the improvement of judicial review - in the rationalization of rules on standing, in presentation of evidence in references (one of the real problems with the
Manitoba Egg Reference), and in the judicial articulation of general principles capable of application to future situations. But it is too soon, I think, to
urge or foretell the abandonment of constitutional litigation in favour of the
political processes.
In its breadth of view and provocative conclusions the chapter provides
stimulating reading on the role of the Court in relation to the constitution.
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